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Abstract
The UK’s response to COVID-19 has been widely criticized by scientists and the public. According to 
EuroMOMO, a European mortality monitoring initiative, the excess mortality that may be attributable 
to COVID-19 in England is one of the highest in Europe, second only to Spain. While critiqued from a 
public health perspective, much less attention is given to the implications of the pandemic outbreak for 
the right to health as defined under international human rights law and ratified by member states. Using 
the UK as a case study, we examine critically the extent to which the government’s response to COVID-19 
complied with the legal framework of the right to health. We review further key state obligations on the 
right to health and assess its suitability in times of pandemic. Finally, we offer some recommendations 
for an update of the right to health. This paper adds to the body of literature on the right to health and 
human rights based-approaches to health, which, to our knowledge, has not yet focused on pandemics.
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Introduction
On April 22, 2020, the European Committee of 
Social Rights, which is the body responsible for 
overseeing the implementation of the European 
Social Charter, issued its Statement of Interpreta-
tion on the Right to Protection of Health in Times of 
Pandemic.1 This statement emphasizes the interre-
lation of the right to protection of health with other 
rights enshrined in the European Social Charter, 
such as the right to social and medical assistance, 
the right to housing, the right to freedom from 
poverty and social exclusion, and the right to safe 
and healthy working conditions. States’ obligations 
to realize further the right to health in response to 
COVID-19 was also addressed by UK experts in 
a submission to the Parliament Joint Committee 
of Human Rights in July 2020.2 The submission 
includes recommendations for the protection of 
vulnerable groups, preparedness, essential medical 
goods, testing and tracing, lockdowns, vaccines, 
the right to other health services, long-term care 
for COVID-19 patients, international cooperation, 
and accountability.
These statements show the importance of 
systematically applying the right to health to public 
health policies when addressing the COVID-19 
pandemic. This idea has also been reiterated by the 
United Nations (UN), the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO), and the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the right to health.3 
The UK’s response to the pandemic has been 
widely criticized by experts in human rights and 
the public health community.4 Analyses from Euro-
MOMO, a European mortality monitoring project, 
show that England has the second-worst excess 
mortality in Europe.5 At the same time, the UK is 
a signatory to several UN and regional treaties pro-
tecting the right to health, including the European 
Social Charter and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).6 
In this context, we take the UK as a case study 
to evaluate its early response to the pandemic and 
to assess the extent to which it fulfilled its obliga-
tions arising from the right to health. We use the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ General Comment 14 as the legal reference 
to assess five of the UK’s core obligations arising 
from the right to health: (1) to ensure the right of 
access to health facilities, goods, and services on a 
nondiscriminatory basis; (2) to ensure access to the 
minimum essential food; (3) to take measures to 
prevent, treat, and control epidemic and endemic 
diseases; (4) to provide education and access to 
information concerning health; and (5) to provide 
appropriate training for health personnel.7 We 
choose to rely on General Comment 14 because, 
although not binding, it constitutes a global under-
standing of the normative content of the right to 
health.8 We build on General Comment 14’s analy-
sis to reflect on the legal framework of the right to 
health and offer some recommendations to adapt it 
further to the context of pandemics.
This article contributes to the robust interna-
tional legal framework for the right to health. So far, 
the literature has explored various areas, including 
health rights in HIV/AIDS and maternal health, as 
well as policy issues such as patent rights and access 
to medicines. To our knowledge, the right to health 
in the context of pandemics has not yet been sys-
tematically discussed.
The UK and the right to health
The UK has signed and ratified the 1961 European 
Social Charter and the 1966 ICESCR, which protect 
the right to health in their articles 11 and 12, respec-
tively.9 It is also a signatory to other UN treaties 
that protect the right to health of specific groups, 
including the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.10 
We assess the extent to which the UK respect-
ed its obligations under the right to health when 
it responded to the onset of the pandemic, from 
February to May 2020. This period was crucial for 
preparedness and the adoption of right to health 
principles such as availability, accessibility, accept-
ability, and quality of health services, as well as 
nondiscrimination, participation, and accountabil-
ity of the state in its public health response.
During these four months, the government 
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took decisions on triaging patients in primary 
health care, testing and tracing, the provision of 
essential medical goods and personal protective 
equipment (PPE), lockdown measures, and the 
communication of data on incidence and mortality 
for epidemiological research. All of these decisions 
had an impact on the right to health of the pop-
ulation, including their access to health services, 
equal access to treatment, the right to access health 
information, and the right to be treated for diseases 
other than COVID-19.
The right to health requires states to take 
positive action and engage their financial and hu-
man resources. As a result, they are subject to the 
principles of progressive realization and maximum 
available resources—in other words, states must 
take steps to realize the right to health gradually 
and continuously over time, and they must not take 
any retrogressive action.11 To that effect, however, 
there are some core obligations that each state must 
fulfill immediately to realize the right to health, 
regardless of its economic and human resources. 
Such obligations are outlined by the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in General 
Comment 14 (Box 1).12 Because the core obligations 
must be applied immediately and are not subject to 
the availability of resources, we chose to assess the 
UK’s adherence to five of these obligations that we 
found relevant in the context of its early response 
to the pandemic.
The UK’s response to COVID-19
To tackle outbreaks of infectious diseases, WHO 
recommends containing their spread by test-
ing persons for a given disease, tracing their 
contacts, quarantining suspected cases, and treat-
ing confirmed cases. If the disease has spread in 
the community, the government must ensure that 
health facilities can cope with the patients who 
require hospital care.13 
On December 31, 2019, WHO’s China Country 
Office received a report about an unknown virus 
behind a number of pneumonia cases in Wuhan.14 
On January 12, 2020, the Chinese government made 
the genetic sequence of the virus publicly available.15 
This was to facilitate international efforts to develop 
diagnostic tools, to speed up research for a vaccine, 
and to ensure preparedness in case of an outbreak. 
Meanwhile, the situation degraded rapidly, and on 
Box 1. Key obligations from General Comment 14 on the right to health
Source: Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 
UN Doc. E/C12/2000/4 (2000), paras. 43–44.
Core minimum obligations
a. To ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for 
vulnerable or marginalized groups;
b. To ensure access to the minimum essential food which is nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure freedom 
from hunger to everyone;
c. To ensure access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and an adequate supply of safe and potable water;
d. To provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined under the WHO Action Programme on Essential 
Drugs;
e. To ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and services;
f. To adopt and implement a national public health strategy and plan of action, on the basis of epidemiological 
evidence, addressing the health concerns of the whole population …
Obligations of comparable priority
a. To ensure reproductive, maternal and child health care;
b. To provide immunisation against the major infectious diseases occurring in the community;
c. To take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases;
d. To provide education and access to information concerning the main health problems in the community, 
including methods of preventing and controlling them;
e. To provide appropriate training for health personnel.
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January 30, 2020, the WHO director-general de-
clared a “Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern.”16 WHO’s Emergency Committee issued 
temporary recommendations: “All countries should 
be prepared for containment,  including  active 
surveillance, early detection, isolation and case man-
agement, contact tracing and prevention of onward 
spread of 2019-nCoV infection, and to share full data 
with WHO.”17 This coincided with the UK reporting 
its first lab-confirmed case of COVID-19. Figure 1 
presents a timeline of key responses in the UK.
Obligation 1: Ensure the right of access 
to health facilities, goods, and services on 
a nondiscriminatory basis, especially for 
vulnerable and marginalized groups 
Ensuring nondiscriminatory access to health care 
demands that attention be given to specific vul-
nerable groups. In the context of COVID-19, early 
analyses revealed that social inequalities exacerbate 
risks of COVID-19 and highlighted key vulnerable 
groups. These include elderly persons with chronic 
conditions, minority ethnic populations, persons 
with physical or mental disabilities, persons from 
the lowest wealth quintile, and non-COVID pa-
tients with a serious illness.18 The failure of the 
UK government to tackle these vulnerabilities and 
make specific provisions for vulnerable groups 
resulted in excess deaths among black, Asian, and 
minority ethnic (BAME) groups, as well as social 
care homes.19 This marks a violation of their right 
to health.
Generally, access to primary health care in the 
UK was severely disrupted. From mid-March, gen-
eral practices implemented triage by phone, thus 
limiting the number of patients allowed to visit in 
person or referred to another health professional.20 
The health impacts on primary care disruption 
have yet to be estimated but will have mid- to long-
term implications for the National Health Service 
(NHS), with some chronic conditions worsening, 
new conditions diagnosed too late, and referrals to 
special services such as cancer and mental health 
being postponed or canceled. Because of the long 
queuing time over the phone and the digitaliza-
tion of health consultations, phone triages may be 
discriminatory toward poorer households whose 
phone contracts may limit communication time 
each month and toward older patients who may 
find the use of new technologies challenging.
Access to acute care services was also se-
verely affected. On March 17, 2020, hospitals were 
instructed to suspend all elective surgeries for at 
least three months.21 NHS trusts were instructed 
to redesign their services to free up capacity for 
COVID-19 patients.22 Yet it is estimated that 50% of 
elective procedures can inflict significant harm to 
the patient if postponed or canceled.23 
Several guides were published by NHS En-
gland to propose a system of priority levels for 
surgical procedures for cancer patients.24 On March 
30, it advised maintaining cancer treatment during 
the COVID-19 response.26 However, the noncom-
pulsory nature of the document meant that the 
responsibility lay with local health trusts, which 
introduced inconsistency in the guidance’s im-
plementation.25 As a result, some high-risk cancer 
patients now face delays in their treatment.26 
In addition, national cancer screening was 
suspended to allow the deployment of frontline 
health workers for COVID-19.27 The number of 
high-risk patients being referred by their general 
practitioner to cancer diagnosis dropped by rough-
ly 70% in Scotland and Northern Ireland.28 
While the government prioritized the treat-
ment of COVID-19 patients, it failed to ensure that 
other serious health conditions could be diagnosed 
and treated promptly. By publishing soft guidance 
for local NHS trusts, the state delegated its re-
sponsibility to ensure access to health services and 
facilities to everyone, which also created inequali-
ties in access among geographical regions.
Obligation 2: Ensure access to the minimum 
essential food
This obligation means that the government must 
take action, if necessary, to ensure that low-income 
persons and homeless persons have access, on a 
daily basis, to the minimum essential food that is 
nutritionally adequate and safe.29 
On March 21–22, 2020, the weekend preceding 
the lockdown, many people rushed to supermarkets 
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Figure 1. Timeline of the key early responses to the COVID-19 outbreak in the UK, February–May 2020
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and started stockpiling supplies such as food and 
antibacterial handwash. In its official guidance, the 
UK government focused on food hygiene, social dis-
tancing, and employee sickness but did not include 
any advice for supermarkets on how to regulate the 
flow of supplies.30 Nor did it advise citizens to shop 
responsibly.31 As a result, the week running up to 
and the first few weeks of the lockdown witnessed 
a scarcity of fresh fruit, vegetables, milk, and bread 
in supermarkets. More affluent households were 
able to stockpile, while poorer households found 
themselves unable to procure essential items due to 
their scarcity. 
The government appeared to leave the burden 
of decision-making to private actors—namely su-
permarkets—to ensure that there was an adequate 
food supply. Partial regulation was seen at some 
point, when the government relaxed competition 
laws to allow supermarkets to exchange otherwise 
competitively sensitive information.32 The aim was 
to allow supermarkets to shift the priority from 
competing with one another toward ensuring that 
enough essential items would be available every-
where in the country. The Coronavirus Act 2020 
on food supply provided only a monitoring power 
to the government through the requesting of infor-
mation from businesses or persons working in the 
food industry.33 One may argue that the state had 
a duty to regulate supermarkets in order to ensure 
the availability of food for the entire nation.
The lack of strong government intervention 
meant that existing inequalities in access to food 
widened. People living on low wages or who had 
lost their job during the lockdown increased the 
demand on food banks. At the same time, dona-
tions decreased due to stockpiling. Families relying 
on school meals for their children also found them-
selves in strenuous situations.34 This situation 
represents a violation of the state’s core obligation 
to ensure access to minimum essential food and 
the right to food, as protected by article 11 of the 
ICESCR.
Obligation 3: Take measures to prevent, treat, 
and control epidemic and endemic diseases
A state can prevent and control an infectious dis-
ease by providing vaccination at the population 
level. With no vaccine available for the SARS-CoV-2 
virus, states are left with the test-and-trace strategy, 
as well as scaling up their health care system’s ca-
pacity to treat new cases.35 
On March 1, 2020, the UK recorded its highest 
surge in new cases, which represented a doubling 
of the number of cases in just three days.36 The 
government had had one month from WHO’s 
declaration of the “Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern” to the country’s first surge 
in cases to prepare its response to infection with the 
novel coronavirus. During this period, the official 
strategy was unclear, and communication to the 
public was inconsistent.
On March 3, 2020, the official strategy from 
the government’s Coronavirus Action Plan was to 
contain, delay, research, and mitigate.37 However, in 
mid-March, the government contemplated achiev-
ing herd immunity by allowing a large proportion 
of its population to become infected and then 
recover.38 At the time, estimates suggested that up 
to 260,000 deaths could have been expected.39 This 
approach came under scrutiny for lack of evidence 
on immunity, and uncertainty around the epidemi-
ology of the virus and the disease it causes.
Following substantial criticism from the sci-
entific community at home and abroad, as well as 
media scrutiny, the government shifted its strat-
egy on March 16.40 People were strongly advised 
to stay at home, but the decision to travel to work 
remained with employers. Social venues remained 
open until March 20, and it was not mandatory for 
major events to be canceled. On March 23, a nation-
al lockdown was finally announced, and a few days 
later it went into effect.41
Although the government’s new strategy 
followed WHO’s advice, it came too late.42 The 
incubation period for COVID-19 meant that the 
effect of the lockdown would be seen only after 
about two weeks. Meanwhile, the NHS was faced 
with a rapid increase in the number of patients who 
needed treatment in intensive care units, including 
artificial ventilation for lung failure.
Despite the government’s strategy to prioritize 
strengthening the capacity of the health care sys-
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tem and maintaining the functionality of tertiary 
services, it failed to equip health care workers ade-
quately with PPE and to provide enough ventilators 
for seriously ill patients.43 For instance, on March 17, 
the UK failed to take up an offer from the European 
Union to join a joint procurement call to buy venti-
lators for 25 member states.44 The resultant shortage 
in PPE meant that NHS staff on the front lines 
were risking their lives. When NHS staff developed 
COVID-19 symptoms, they had to self-isolate for 
14 days, thus reducing the workforce further.45 The 
government also failed to enforce guidelines to re-
duce transmission to residents and workers in care 
homes, among whom the proportion of new cases 
and deaths was later shown to be much higher than 
in other population groups.46 
The NHS Test and Trace service was paused 
from March 13 to May 28. It reopened after the peak 
of the epidemic had passed and after the first easing 
of the national lockdown had been implemented.47 
During the peak of the epidemic, the government 
attempted to scale up testing capacity but failed.48 
In late April, it was reported that the government 
met its target of carrying out 100,000 tests a day, 
but the methods used for reporting artificially in-
flated the numbers.49
The lack of a clear national strategy based on 
transparent epidemiological evidence and the lack 
of clear official communications mark a failure to 
prepare for the epidemic. The reliance on self-isola-
tion while pubs, offices, and major events remained 
open; the delay in implementing a national lock-
down; and the long suspension of the Test and Trace 
service constitute a failure by the UK government 
to take strong action to contain and control the 
spread of the virus. The lack of sufficient PPE for 
NHS workers and people in social care homes, and 
of ventilators for seriously ill patients, represents a 
failure to treat and control the epidemic. 
Obligation 4: Provide education and access to 
information concerning health
Two obligations can be distinguished in relation to 
information. First, states must report on their prog-
ress to fulfill the right to health and publish reliable 
data on indicators such as incidence and mortality. 
Second, states have a duty to ensure that quality 
health information is circulated to the public.50 
Data about COVID-19 are questionable every-
where, including the UK. It is impossible to know 
the true incidence rate because some infections 
produce few or no symptoms. While the effects of 
the disease range from mild to severe to fatal, the 
UK was not initially testing people outside hospi-
tals. Even calls to NHS 111, the national helpline, 
from people with COVID-19 symptoms were not 
systematically registered. Deaths due to COVID-19 
outside hospitals were not routinely reported by 
government agencies, therefore underestimating 
the death toll. Deaths in hospitals that are attribut-
ed to COVID-19 among patients with underlying 
conditions lack clarity because the cause of death 
may not necessarily be COVID-19. The curve of 
deaths may also not be reliable because deaths were 
being reported at the time of registration, not in 
relation to the date of death. Reporting times vary 
between health centers. 51 Without reliable data, 
public policy cannot be properly informed. For 
these reasons, scientists recommend relying on the 
number of excess deaths for international compari-
sons of COVID-19-related deaths.52 
The WHO director-general used the term 
“infodemic” to describe an excessive amount of 
information about the COVID-19 pandemic, which 
makes it difficult for the general public to identi-
fy reliable information and act responsibly.53 The 
“infodemic” has caused both health-related and 
economic damages in the UK, partly because the 
government failed to prevent and control misin-
formation. For instance, some conspiracy theories 
fueled the belief that SARS-CoV-2 was made in a 
lab, or that it was spread through the 5G commu-
nications network, resulting in attacks on telecom 
engineers and the burning of cell phone towers.54 
Official communication on the country’s testing ca-
pacity was unclear, with numbers on testing capacity 
artificially inflated and the number of COVID-19 
cases deflated.55 Communication around herd im-
munity sent the wrong signals to the population, 
days before the government announced that every-
one should voluntarily self-isolate. These examples 
show a failure of the UK government to uphold its 
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duty to control the information communicated so 
that members of the public had the necessary tools 
to make informed choices regarding their health 
and how to protect the health of others. 
Obligation 5: Provide appropriate training for 
health personnel 
A key function of the health system is to train its 
workers and ensure that they are ready to handle 
outbreaks of disease.56 The situation in late March 
2020 in the UK, about one month after the start 
of the COVID-19 outbreak in the country, showed 
inadequate training of health workers to respond to 
such an emergency.57 
In 2016, Exercise Cygnus, a simulation ex-
ercise, was conducted to evaluate the capacity 
of the NHS in the event of a pandemic. The final 
report was kept secret, with some commentators 
arguing that it would have revealed that the NHS 
was unprepared for a pandemic.58 It culminated 
in a freedom of information request from an NHS 
doctor in April 2020.59 The report was eventually 
leaked to the Guardian, which published it in the 
interest of the public on May 7.60 
One of the report’s key findings was that “the 
UK’s preparedness and response, in terms of its 
plans, policies and capability, is not sufficient to 
cope with the extreme demands of a severe pan-
demic that will have a nationwide impact across all 
sectors.”61 In addition, the report identified a need 
to develop a “methodology for assessing social care 
capacity and surge capacity during a pandemic,” 
as well as to examine “the possibility of expanding 
social care real-estate and staffing capacity.”62 These 
recommendations were not communicated to key 
stakeholders, as the chief executive of Care England 
testified.63 
The lack of appropriate training for health 
personnel also comes from a more structural issue 
within the UK’s health system. The social care 
sector in England has seen drastic financial cuts 
for the past 10 years, in addition to privatization. 
Working conditions for social care workers are 
deplorable, with low-paying and zero-hours con-
tracts, as well as long hours for junior doctors.64 The 
social care sector is now almost exclusively in the 
private sector and isolated from the NHS. Because 
of these structural issues, the current public health 
crisis has only amplified the problems faced by a 
tired and deficient workforce.65 
The state’s failure to implement the recom-
mendations from the pandemic preparedness 
exercise, its efforts to keep the final report confi-
dential, and the fragmentation and privatization 
of the NHS and social care sector over the past 10 
years mark a failure to comply with the obligation 
to train health workers and prepare the health 
sector to respond to outbreaks of diseases. It is a 
failure not only under international human rights 
law but also under the WHO Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness Framework.66
This brief examination of the UK govern-
ment’s early response to COVID-19 reveals four 
types of consequences from the failure to respect, 
protect, and fulfill the right to health, as illustrated 
in Table 1. The first type concerns direct health con-
sequences—for example, people dying as a result of 
COVID-19, people losing family members to the 
disease, or people left with long-term sequelae after 
surviving an infection with the virus. The second 
concerns direct economic consequences—for ex-
ample, people losing their jobs or homes, people 
being dragged into poverty, or children being 
unable to access school meals. The third category 
includes indirect health consequences, particularly 
for non-COVID patients with other serious health 
conditions. For instance, the diagnosis, manage-
ment, and follow-up of cancer patients was greatly 
affected, which will almost inevitably lead to worse 
cancer outcomes.67 This category also includes 
consequences stemming from the psychological 
impact of the lockdown. Finally, the fourth type 
concerns indirect economic consequences—for ex-
ample, people bearing the costs of more expensive 
treatment for pre-existing health conditions or the 
loss of their job due to health complications after a 
late cancer diagnosis. Other indirect consequences 
stemming from the government’s failure to provide 
reliable information about the virus include prop-
erty damage to 5G towers. All of these consequences 
have an impact on one another; for example, people 
dragged into poverty due to the pandemic are more 
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likely to experience worse health later in life, since 
poverty is a social determinant of health.68 
While late action from the government is to 
blame, the inadequacy of national responses world-
wide also brings under scrutiny the utility and 
appropriateness of international legal provisions 
regarding the right to health. Are these legal texts 
adequate to address preparedness, surveillance, 
and promotion of the right to health for everyone 
in times of pandemic?
The international legal framework on 
pandemics and the right to health 
We find that references to pandemics or public 
health crises are limited in human rights law 
documents.
General Comment 14 encourages “the creation 
of a system of urgent medical care in cases of acci-
dents, epidemics and similar health hazards, and 
the provision of disaster relief and humanitarian 
assistance in emergency situations.”69 This is sup-
plemented by the European Committee on Social 
Rights’ Statement of Interpretation on the Right to 
Protection of Health in Times of Pandemic, which 
outlines states’ obligations to test, trace, and impose 
measures of physical distancing or lockdown and 
to ensure the availability of hospital beds, intensive 
care units, and PPE for health workers.70 Of partic-
ular relevance to the UK, the European Committee 
on Social Rights emphasizes the need for states to 
act as soon as preliminary scientific evaluation in-
dicates reasonable grounds for concern regarding 
potentially dangerous effects of a virus or other 
factors on human health.71 The UK’s delay in im-
plementing a national lockdown and the confusion 
generated by the government’s communications 
concerning the official public health strategy re-
veal the importance of such obligations. They all 
point toward states’ duty to prepare adequately for 
a pandemic and to ensure the availability of suffi-
cient material and human resources to treat a large 
number of patients at any one time.
Further, international human rights law 
points toward a “collective responsibility” of the 
international community with regard to outbreaks 
of infectious diseases.72 In the present context, 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights clarified that international cooperation 
means sharing medical equipment and best prac-
tices to combat the virus, sharing knowledge for the 
development of a vaccine, and engaging in joint ac-
tion to minimize the economic and social impacts 
of the public health crisis.73 International cooper-
ation around COVID-19 seems to have been weak 
at first, with Italy’s call for help met with silence 
from other European countries.74 On April 2, 2020, 
the President of the European Commission called 
for solidarity among European Union countries.75 
At the global level, many countries contributed to 
the COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund.76 How-
ever, this generosity was soon overshadowed by 
the announcement from President Trump that the 
United States would withdraw its funding to WHO. 
International cooperation has not been satisfactory, 
and the pandemic response has emerged as a turf 
war between different polities, with some coun-
try leaders blaming China or banning exports of 
medicine.77 
We did not find further mentions of pandem-
ics or public health emergencies in international 
human rights instruments. The closest thing we 
found was these instruments’ inclusion of states’ 
duty to engage in international cooperation and 
Health Economic
Direct • COVID-19 deaths and long-term sequelae • Job losses
• Homelessness
• Child poverty
Indirect • Cancer outcomes
• Psychological impact of the lockdown
• Costs of worse cancer outcomes
• Property damage on 5G masts
Table 1. Examples of health and economic consequences of the failure to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health in 
times of pandemic
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to create systems of urgent care. However, as illus-
trated by the example of the UK in the COVID-19 
pandemic, many other issues require attention, 
such as the training of medical staff in infection 
prevention and control, the prompt response and 
planning from the government as soon as scien-
tific evidence becomes available, the transparency 
of the government’s response based on scientific 
evidence, the accuracy of data collected, the pro-
vision of continuing care for everyone (including 
patients with conditions other than COVID-19), 
the management of intensive care services, and the 
regulation of food supplies, to name but a few. In 
this regard, the Statement of Interpretation on the 
Right to Protection of Health in Times of Pandemic 
from the European Committee on Social Rights 
constitutes an encouraging development, because it 
extends states’ obligations to include the adoption 
of public health measures to prevent, contain, and 
control the spread of viruses, as well as to treat the 
diseases they cause. 
The 2005 International Health Regulations 
and the 2013 Pandemic Influenza Risk Management: 
WHO Interim Guidance are key international legal 
documents that apply to all WHO member states 
with regard to preparing for outbreaks of infectious 
diseases.78 While they are of critical importance 
from a public health perspective, we argue that they 
are not sufficient for the protection of the right to 
health in times of pandemic because they do not 
propose a rights-based approach to public health 
emergencies. They should, however, inform future 
development of the right to health.
Recommendations
International human rights law on the right to 
health needs updating. The inadequacy of respons-
es to the COVID-19 pandemic in order to protect 
and safeguard human rights signals an urgent need 
for the firm grounding of pandemic preparedness 
plans in human rights principles, and simultaneous 
reviewing of the suitability of human rights instru-
ments in health emergency contexts. 
The example of the UK shows that the public 
health response must explicitly address vulnerable 
groups in the general population—including older 
patients with chronic conditions, ethnic minorities, 
non-COVID patients with a serious health condi-
tion (such as cancer), and people with mental or 
physical disabilities—to ensure universal access to 
health services and facilities.
Addressing human rights is especially 
needed during lockdown since such measures dis-
proportionately affect vulnerable groups, including 
women experiencing abuse.79 Early studies suggest 
that BAME communities are more likely to die of 
COVID-19 than white people.80 This may be due to 
the increased pressure faced by BAME doctors and 
nurses to see infected patients in settings without 
PPE, the fact that people from ethnic minorities are 
more likely to live in severely affected areas, and 
BAME individuals’ greater likelihood of having 
underlying health conditions.81 Either way, states 
must implement measures that will protect groups 
at higher risk of dying from the disease, including 
those in social care homes.
Protecting vulnerable groups extends beyond 
access to health care. In the UK, many households 
are now affected economically by the crisis, as ob-
served with the increased demand for food banks.
Experience in the UK also shows the need for 
a clear national strategy from the outset, as soon 
as a risk is reasonably identified through scientific 
evidence. Political action must be prompt, based on 
scientific evidence, transparent, and communicat-
ed clearly to the population. A soft approach like 
the one adopted by the UK in the weeks preceding 
the lockdown, where private actors with economic 
power remained in charge of deciding whether 
people should travel to work and whether events 
would be maintained, should be avoided.
Further, communication around the pandem-
ic necessitates a minimum level of control by the 
state. While it is important to maintain freedom of 
the press and freedom of expression, the state must 
guide the public toward reliable sources of infor-
mation that are transparent and based on science. 
Data on the virus must be published using a clear 
method so as not to mislead the public, as pointed 
out by the UK Statistics Authority when criticizing 
the misuse of statistics by the Secretary of State for 
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Health on June 2, 2020.82
Because in the UK, as in many other countries, 
health workers initially lacked PPE in sufficient 
number and quality, the provision of essential 
medical goods must be at the forefront of a state’s 
response to a pandemic—without, however, depriv-
ing other countries of such goods.
Based on the UK example of a state’s response 
to COVID-19, we call on international experts in 
human rights, health systems, infectious diseases, 
noncommunicable diseases, emergency care, and 
humanitarian disasters to develop a robust frame-
work of protections that would be applicable in 
times of pandemic. This framework should include 
the following:
• A universal right to access urgent medical care 
on a nondiscriminatory basis
• A universal right to screening, prompt diagnosis, 
treatment, and continuing care for the non-
communicable diseases included in Sustainable 
Development Goal 3 (cancer, diabetes, heart 
diseases, and respiratory diseases) on a nondis-
criminatory basis
• The duty of states to act promptly and prepare 
for a disease outbreak as soon as scientific evi-
dence indicates reasonable grounds for concern 
regarding potentially dangerous effects of a virus 
or other factors on human health
• The duty of states to adopt a national response 
plan based on scientific evidence available to the 
public
• The duty of states to ensure accurate data col-
lection and dissemination by public agencies or 
universities, without political interference
• The duty of states to disaggregate data on 
grounds of discrimination, such as sex, ethnicity, 
and socioeconomic status
• The duty of states, using an intersectionality lens, 
to monitor risks of infection and access to health 
care for vulnerable groups
• The duty of states, in collaboration with WHO 
and social media platforms, to control the spread 
of misinformation and rumors about viruses and 
the diseases they cause, including racial blame 
and victimization
• The duty of states to ensure the regular flow of 
food supplies everywhere in their territories, 
with particular attention to deprived households
• The duty of states to ensure that medical staff 
have the necessary resources to work, including 
PPE, disinfectant, and medical supplies of ade-
quate quality relevant to the disease being treated
In addition, the right to health as enshrined in 
international law should be updated to include the 
following provisions:
• A core minimum obligation to ensure access to 
emergency care on a nondiscriminatory basis
• The duty of states to build and support robust 
and resilient health systems based on scientific 
evidence, on WHO’s six building blocks (gov-
ernance, financing, workforce, products and 
technologies, information and research, and ser-
vice delivery), and on human rights principles
• The training of health and social care profession-
als in infection prevention and control, in both 
the public and private sectors
Such provisions could either be added to a revised 
version of General Comment 14 or be included in 
a new general comment on the right to health in 
times of pandemic. Regional human rights bodies 
such as the European Committee on Social Rights, 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights, the Arab Human Rights Committee, 
and the South Asian Association for Regional Co-
operation should adopt recommendations on the 
right to health in times of pandemic and consider 
including the above provisions.
Conclusion
The risk of pandemics from new viruses is likely 
to increase due to a growing world population, ur-
banization, and frequency of international travel, 
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together with the presence of live animal markets 
in densely populated areas. The Statement on the 
Right to Health in Times of Pandemic from the Eu-
ropean Committee on Social Rights builds on the 
robust international legal framework on the right 
to health and constitutes an encouraging basis to 
develop it further.
In this article, we observe the UK’s response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic and identify some is-
sues that have emerged in such exceptional times. 
We argue that the right to health as enacted today 
is not sufficient to address these issues. The current 
international human rights framework is robust, 
but states’ obligations should be clarified so they 
can be adapted to public health measures in times 
of pandemic. At the same time, international public 
health documents to prepare for pandemics are not 
sufficient on their own to protect the right to health 
of everyone. We offer some recommendations to 
that effect.
Writing about issues as we witness them 
allows us to construct reliable historic memory. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused many deaths 
that could have been avoided had we been better 
prepared with strong rights-based provisions. 
These are essential lessons to be learned, and the 
human rights community has a crucial role to play 
to ensure that future responses to pandemics are 
grounded into human rights law.
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